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IMPROVING JURY DELIBERATIONS: 
A RECONSIDERATION OF LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
Jury deadlocks in criminal cases create numerous problems. Unless 
the trial judge can somehow break the deadlock, the jury will remain 
''hung'' 1 and the judge must declare a mistrial. 2 If the state chooses to 
pursue a conviction after a mistrial, it must either negotiate a guilty plea 
with the defendant or repeat the trial process. If, however, the judge 
wishes to avoid a hung jury and chooses to encourage the jury to reach 
a verdict, the jury may be given further instructions designed to break 
the deadlock. Such instructions may range in tone from relatively general 
statements about the necessity of compromise, to more coercive instruc-
tions designed to achieve minority capitulation. 3 
In some cases, the evidence presented at trial permits the judge to in-
struct the jury on offenses less s.erious than the crime charged - so-called 
lesser included offenses. 4 These instructions can be presented in various 
I. Professor Leo Flynn defined a hung jury as "a jury (I) which, in the judgment of the 
court, has deliberated for a proper period of time, and (2) which has been discharged by the 
court because there appears to be no reasonable probability that the jury can agree upon a ver-
dict." Flynn, Does Justice Fail When the Jury is Deadlocked?, 61 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1977). 
Statutes and legal dictionaries have come up with similar definitions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE 
§ 1140 (West 1970); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 667 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. See generally Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 486-90 (1977). 
3. Instructions to induce compromises are commonly called "Allen instructions," after Allen 
v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), in which the Supreme Court affirmed their use. See infra . 
note 49. 
4. Many courts, legislatures, and commentators have defined lesser included offenses. A com-
posite definition, sufficient for the purposes of this Note, is those offenses the elements of which 
are contained in the charged offense, or offenses which must be committed during the commis-
sion of the greater offense. 
Professor Charles Wright provided a definition of "lesser included offense" and several useful 
examples: 
One offense is necessarily included in another if it is impossible to commit the greater 
without also having committed the lesser. Thus murder includes such lesser offenses 
as second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Robbery necessarily 
includes larceny, and assault with intent to rob. Rape necessarily includes assault with 
intent to rape. Assault with a dangerous weapon includes simple assault. Theft of prop-
erty in excess of $100 includes the lesser wrong of theft of property of value not ex-
ceeding $100. In each of these instances some of the elements of the greater crime charged 
are in themselves enough to constitute the lesser crime. 
The rule also provides in terms that the jury may find the defendant guilty of an 
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ways, from restrictive instructions that may coerce minority jurors5 by 
requiring extended deliberations on the charged offense; to more flexi-
ble instructions that promote compromise on lesser offenses but that may 
allow for quick decisions not based on the merits. Neither undue coer-
cion nor unmerited compromise is a desirable outcome, but this is often 
the only choice when the judge wishes to avoid a hung jury. Given such 
a choice, this Note contends that the flexible, compromise approach is 
preferred, both because coercion is legally and psychologically undesirable 
and because juries will not abuse their power to compromise. 
This Note approves of efforts to avoid hung juries by giving lesser 
included offense instructions but opposes those instructions that restrict 
juror decisions and coerce minority jurors. Rather, this Note offers a 
lesser included offense instruction that promotes flexibility and jury com-
promise without undermining the deliberative process. Part I describes 
the problem of hung juries and how courts have tried to prevent them 
with restrictive lesser included offense instructions. Part II analyzes the 
coercive impact of restrictive lesser included offense instructions and con-
cludes that an instruction conditioning deliberations upon individual juror 
disagreement better promotes compromises on the merits while reduc-
ing hung juries and juror coercion. 
1. AVOIDING HUNG JURIES WITH COERCIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The American jury trial, despite a long and distinguished history, 6 has 
been under constant fire by members of the bench and bar. 7 One facet 
of jury trials is particularly vulnerable to criticism: hung juries. Attempts 
to resolve these jury deadlocks also cause problems because efforts to 
urge the jury to reach a verdict may be too heavy-handed and give the 
judge undue influence over jury deliberations. 
attempt to commit the offense charged - or an offense necessarily included therein 
- if an attempt is an offense. 
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 515, at 21-23 (1982) (citations omitted). 
5. Juror coercion, for the purposes of this Note, is any implicit or explicit influence, other 
than the merits of the case, exerted by any individual connected with the trial, that convinces 
a juror in the minority to change his or her vote. The type of coercion discussed in this Note 
concerns supplemental judicial instructions or pleas of fellow jurors to abandon a position without 
regard for its basis or reasonableness. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. 
6. For a lengthy and informative history of the jury trial, see L. MooRE, THE JURY: TOOL 
OF KINGS, PALLADIDM OF LIBERTY (1973). Within the last 15 years, the Supreme Court has made 
use of the jury's history to define the limits and requirements of the sixth amendment right 
to a trial by jury. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-10 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78, 87-99 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968). 
7. See. e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-45 (1949). See generally H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, 
THE AMERICAN JURY 3-11 (1966); Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 
1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 601. 
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A. The Problem With Hung Juries 
Of over 200,000 criminal jury trials for felony offenses in the United 
States each year, 8 between five and twelve percent end in hung juries. 9 
Consequently, at least 10,000 and perhaps more than 24,000 jury trials 
end with the jury unable to agree on a verdict. These numerous stalemates 
are the source of many problems. 
A hung jury produces a wholly unsatisfactory conclusion to the criminal 
trial for it is neither an acquittal nor a conviction. In forty percent of 
the cases, the state opts not to retry the defendant. 1° For the defendant 
who did not commit the crime, release after a hung jury and release after 
an acquittal should make little difference, except for the benefit acquit-
tal provides to an injured reputation. It is more likely, however, that the 
defendant released following a hung jury did, in fact, commit some crime, 
though not necessarily the principal crime charged. 11 For these technically 
8. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 117 (4th ed. 1980); Friedrich, We, the Jury, Find 
the . .. , TIME, Sept. 25, 1981, at 45. 
The number 200,000 is only a rough estimation. No government or private agency keeps records 
on the number of jury trials each year. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 501-09. 
Professors Kalven and Zeise! based their estimates of the annual number of jury trials on surveys 
of local courts, correspondence with state officials, projections, and reports from judicial 
conferences. 
9. Two different studies have attempted to determine the number of hung juries. The first 
study recording the number of hung juries was the "Chicago Jury Project," directed by Harry 
Kalven, Jr., Hans Zeise!, and Fred Strotbeck of the University of Chicago, and sponsored by 
the Ford Foundation. The study based its findings on court records, postdeliberation interviews, 
simulated cases before experimental juries, and the recording of a limited number of actual jury 
deliberations. Public opinion surveys were used to ascertain popular attitudes about the jury 
system. Jury selection was also studied. See D. GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 201 (1966). 
In the process of analyzing court records, the study found hung juries occur in 5.507o of the 
cases. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 57. 
The second study was performed by Professor Leo Flynn at Pomona College. Flynn studied 
three years of results of trials in California's IO largest metropolitan areas (8,021 jury trials 
in felony cases, or 81 % of the felony trial litigation). He found that the jury hung 12.2% of 
the time (978 cases). Flynn, supra note I, at 130. 
Kalven and Zeisel's statistics are not inconsistent with Flynn's, though Flynn's proportion of 
hung juries is higher than Kalven and Zeisel's. Kalven and Zeise! sought to determine the extent 
and nature of disagreement between judges and juries. They mailed questionnaires to judges 
and suspected that some judges may not have returned reports on mistrials. H. KAI.VEN & H. 
ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 57. 
10. See Flynn, supra note l, at 133. 
II. In Flynn's study, 62.6% of the hung juries favored conviction; in 42.1% of the hung 
juries, the vote favoring conviction was 9-3, 10-2, or 11-1. Flynn, supra note l, at 131-32. Kalven 
and Zeise! reported similar findings; 6307o favored conviction and 441l7o favored conviction by 
9-3 or more. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 460. Although the United States Constitu-
tion does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), most states require unanimity, 
see E. PRESCOTT, FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM 9 (1976). Thus, verdicts of 9-3, 10-2, or 11-1 
usually do not result in conviction, so researchers are cautious to mention that such vote splits 
do not conclusively imply a defendant's guilt. See Flynn, supra note I, at 132; see also H. KAI.VEN 
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"guilty" but legally free defendants the hung jury provides an unwar-
ranted exemption from the penal function of the criminal justice system. 
Even when the state reprosecutes, a second trial exacts a heavy price 
from both society and defendants, regardless of the second trial's ver-
dict. Second trials drain state treasuries of millions of dollars per year, 12 
and add to the crowding of court dockets and delays in other cases. 13 
The spectacle of retrials also endangers the legitimacy of the jury system. 
If citizens are to respect the law in their everyday lives, and uphold it 
as jurors, they must perceive the system as just and efficient. 14 Hung 
juries give citizens the impression that the system works poorly. 15 
Moreover, retrials jeopardize the interests of defendants due to the emo-
tional and financial strain of successive defenses. 16 Given these drawbacks, 
the best solution to hung juries would be to avoid situations in which 
a hung jury can result. 
B. Lesser Included Offense Instructions as a Partial 
Solution to Hung Juries 
Instructions affecting deliberations on lesser included offenses could 
lower the number of hung juries. Before one can understand the prob-
able effect of different lesser included offense instructions, however, it 
is important to understand the general background of the lesser included 
& H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 461,489. Nonetheless, in investigations of 64 trials in nonunanimous 
verdict states, Kalven and Zeise! found that juries hung only 3. I% of the time, or 45 % less 
often. Id. at 461. This correlates closely with the percentage of vote splits favoring conviction 
by nine or more jurors in states requiring unanimous jury verdicts. Flynn also found that, following 
a hung jury, 34% of the defendants pied guilty and over two-thirds of the 26% retried were 
convicted. Flynn, supra note I, at 133. 
12. Flynn's study indicates that during a three-year period, hung juries cost the state of Califor-
nia $6.6 million. Flynn, supra note I, at 134. See also E. PRESCOTT, supra note 11, at 9; M. 
SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 85 (1978) (both commenting on the increased 
deliberation time likely in cases ending in hung juries). See generally LAw REFORM CoMM'N OF 
CANADA, CRIMINAL LAW - THE JURY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, WORKING PAPER 27, at 108 (1980). 
13. See Jacobsohn, The Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury Trial, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 
39, 56-57. 
14. A graphic manifestation of the loss of respect for the justice system occurred in Miami, 
Florida, in the early summer of 1980. The acquittal of four former police officers of the beating 
death of a black insurance executive led to widespread violence. In several days of rioting, 16 
people died and over 400 were injured. Residents and the city lost over $100 million in property 
damage. See Williams, Smith & Coppola, Three Days of Black Rage in Miami, NEWSWEEK, 
June 2, 1980, at 34. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti attributed the unrest to "a great perception 
of injustice which has brought a sense of frustration and rage." N.Y. Times, May 20, 1980, 
at Bll, col. I. Ironically, many lawyers blamed the trial's result on the prosecution's questionable 
trial strategy of not trying to obtain jury compromise on a lesser offense. See Beck & Heckoff, 
The McDuffie Case, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1980, at 39. 
15. Jacobsohn, supra note 13, at 57. 
16. See LAW REFORM CoMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 108. 
A guilty defendant does obtain some benefits from a hung jury, but these are not benefits 
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offense doctrine. "Lesser included offenses" are offenses composed of 
elements already contained in the charged offense, or that must be com-
mitted during the perpetration of the charged offense. 11 Typically, one 
of the parties must request the instruction before it can be given, though 
some states require their judges to consider the instruction regardless of 
a request by the parties. 18 The instruction can only be given if, consider-
ing the evidence presented at the trial, the jury could properly convict 
the defendant on some lesser included offense. 19 A defendant cannot be 
found guilty of both the lesser and greater offenses. 20 
.., 
society is bound to protect. Free between trials, a defendant may engage in further criminal 
activity. Additionally, a defendant may escape conviction because witnesses die, disappear, or 
forget their testimony, or because the state cannot afford the time and expense of reprosecution. 
See supra notes 9 & 11. 
17. See supra note 4. See also Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 3i(c); ALA. CODE§ 13A-1-9 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2149 (1977); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1157 (West 1981); IDAHO CoDE § 19-2311 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-9 (Smith-
Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3107(3) (1981); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:5 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 13A (1983); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.32 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.04 (West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-19-5 (1973); MONT. CoDE ANN.§ 46-11-501-2(a) (1981); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW§ 1.20.37 
(McKinney 1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.74 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 916 (West 1958); OR. REV. STAT.§ i36.460 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-18-II0(c) (1982); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09 (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-33-5, 77-33-6 
(1978); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 23.3; Cow. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.510; KY. R. CRIM. 
P. 9.86; N.D. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); R.I. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3l(c); MODEL PENAL 
CoDE § 1.07(4)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
In United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974), the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit summarized the requirements entitling a defendant to a lesser included offense 
instruction: 
(I) a proper request is made; (2) the elements of the lesser offense are identical to part 
of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some evidence which would justify 
conviction of the lesser offense; (4) the proof on the element or elements differentiating 
the two crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defen-
dant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense; and (5) there 
is mutuality, i. e., a charge may be demanded by either the prosecution or the defense. 
(emphasis omitted). 
18. Only North Carolina, Tennessee, and Oklahoma require lesser included offense instruc-
tions sua sponte. See State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E.2d 545 (1954); Strader v. State, 210 
Tenn. 669, 362 S.W.2d 224 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-169 (1978); TENN. CoDE ANN. 
§ 40-18-ll0(c) (1982). Cf Barnett v. State, 560 P.2d 997 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (establishing 
a court-imposed rule that request is not necessary for lesser included offense instructions when 
the charge is first degree murder). 
19. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); FED. R. CRIM. P. 3l(c); SA 
J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 131.03 (2d ed. 1981); 4 W. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE§ 545 (12th ed. 1976); Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Instruction - Problems 
With Its Use, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1968). See generally Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 636 n.12 (I 980) (citing state and federal cases supporting the proposition that "a defendant 
is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction where the evidence warrants it"). 
20. See Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961). In cases where the defendant was 
convicted of both the greater and lesser offenses, the conviction for the lesser offense was vacated. 
See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 576 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851 (1978); 
United States v. Lodwick, 410 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1969). 
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The lesser included offense doctrine was developed as a way for the 
prosecution to obtain a conviction in cases where it had overcharged or 
was unable to prove some element of the crime. 21 Ironically, defendants 
began to request the instruction because it allowed the jury to ''temper 
justice with mercy" by finding the defendant guilty of only some lesser 
offense. 22 
Courts presently conflict over how to present the lesser included offense 
instruction to juries. Generally, most courts have chosen one of two pro-
cedures: (1) the "acquittal" instruction under which the jury is required 
to unanimously acquit the defendant on the charged offense before being 
allowed to deliberate on any lesser included offense or (2) the "reasonable 
doubt" instruction under which the jury can begin to consider lesser in-
cluded offenses once they have reasonable doubt about guilt on the 
charged offense. 
1. The "acquittal" instruction- The acquittal instruction began as 
part of the traditional requirement of jury unanimity23 and was catalyzed 
by pattern jury instructions used by the federal courts in the 1960's. 24 
The instruction states that if jurors "should unanimously find the accused 
'Not Guilty' of the crime charged in the indictment (information) then 
the jury must proceed to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused 
as to any lesser-included offense. " 25 The acquittal instruction has 
been consistently upheld in most federal courts26 and many state courts. 21 
21. See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 514, at 20; see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 
637-38 (1980); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 205 (1973); SA J. MOORE, supra note 
19, 1 31.03(1]. 
22. See supra note 21. 
23. See State v. Wall, 9 N.C. App. 22, 175 S.E.2d 310 (1970); State v. Payne, 199 Wis. 
615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929); Dillon v. State, 137 Wis. 655, 119 N.W. 352 (1909); Ballinger v. 
State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968). 
24. See W. MATHES & E. DEVITT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 15.10 (1st 
ed. 1965). See also infra notes 26-27. 
25. E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 18.05 (3d ed. 
1977). 
26. See United States v. Boffa, No. 81-2660, slip op. (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1982); Pharr v. Israel, 
629 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Jones, No. 77-1506, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 1979); Catches v. United States, 582 
F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1978); Fuller v. United 
States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Singleton, 447 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
27. See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361 (Alaska App. 1982); Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 
3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981); 
Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 12 Mass. 
App. Ct. 562 (1982). 
Many state courts have accepted the acquittal instruction implicitly. See, e.g., State v. Dippre, 
121 Ariz. 596, 592 P.2d 1252 (1979) (holding that it was not erroneous for the judge to submit 
a verdict form to the jury consisting of "guilty/not guilty" for each offense); Price v. State, 
114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914) (holding that a lesser included offense instruction is not 
reversible if it conveys the idea that if the jury has reasonable doubt about guilt on any degree, 
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The acquittal instruction promotes several important goals. By limiting 
jury discretion, it requires conclusive deliberations on the charged of-
fense. All jurors must agree on one charge before proceeding to the next; 
consequently, attention will be paid to the opinions of minority as well 
as majority jurors during the decision-making process. Permitting less 
than unanimous agreement on the charge could discount the views of 
dissenters, for their dissent might not alter the will of the majority. 28 
Moreover, the requirement of unanimous acquittal guards against com-
promise verdicts that may be unrelated to the merits of the case. 
Although courts recognize the jury's right to reach compromise 
verdicts, 29 judges do not encourage such verdicts. In denying'judges the 
authority to give lesser included offense instructions without request, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "[t]o do 
so 'serves only to encourage the jury to exceed its historical function 
of factfinding' and 'exercise its mercy dispensing power' by convicting 
on the lesser rather than on the greater charge.'' 30 The fear of jury com-
promise has prompted many courts and legislatures to restrict the scope 
of the lesser included offense doctrine _by demanding that a party re-
quest the instruction before it can be used. 31 
Limiting jury deliberations to one charge can impede the jury's ability 
to reach a verdict. By indiscriminately preventing compromise the 
acquittai instruction stops not only undesirable compromise, but desirable 
they should acquit of that degree and fmd guilt of a lower degree about which there is no reasonable 
doubt); People v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 3d 43, 592 P.2d 752, 154 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1979) (narrowly 
construing situations in which statutory provisions requiring conviction of only the lesser offense 
apply); State v. Troynack, 174 Conn. 89, 384 A.2d 326 (1977) (approving, in consideration of 
a different issue, an instruction to the jury to consider the lesser offense if it did not find the 
defendant guilty of the charged offense); State v. Leinweber, 303 Minn. 414, 228 N.W.2d 120 
( 1975) (signaling lower courts to give lesser included offense instructions when the evidence sup-
ports conviction of the lesser crime and the defendant is not guilty of the charged offense). 
The language of lesser included offense statutes in many states suggests that courts in those 
states might uphold the "acquittal" instruction. These statutes use the terms "acquittal" and 
"not guilty" in a way suggesting that they are prerequisites to guilt on a lesser included offense. 
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2945.74 (Baldwin 1982); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 40-2520 (1975); 
VA. CoDE § 19.2-285 (1975). Other state rules of criminal procedure convey a similar impression. 
See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 804; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.08 (Vernon 1981). 
The Federal lesser included offense doctrine is the result of judicial interpretation of Rule 
31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 
344 (2d Cir. 1978). Many state rules of criminal procedure parallel the wording of Rule 31(c). 
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 23.3; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.510; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 27(b); N.D. 
R. CRIM. P. 31(c); R.I. R. CRIM. P. 31; VT. R. CRIM. P. 31(c). 
28. Studies of nonunanimous final jury verdicts indicate that the majority neglects the views 
of the minority because unanimity is not necessary for the verdict. See infra notes 56 & 58. 
Once the requisite majority is reached, few attempts are made to persuade dissenting jurors. 
See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
29. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932). 
30. Lightfoot v. United States, 378 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. App. 1977). See also United States 
v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1972). 
31. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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compromise as well. 32 Limiting deliberations to one offense can impede 
the jury's ability to reach a verdict. Because the jury cannot discuss lesser 
included offenses until agreeing to acquit on the charged offense, jurors 
cannot rectify substantial disagreement by compromising on a lesser 
offense composed of elements not disputed by the defendant or by the 
jurors. 33 These restraints on compromise discussions thus fail to 
ameliorate the hung jury problem. 
Some courts have been pleased with the results of the acquittal instruc-
tion but reluctant to use such restrictive procedures on the jury. Because 
the instruction sets out the specific deliberation agenda, jurors are left 
with no discretion or room for compromise. To soften the impact of 
their involvement in jury procedures, some judges have developed alter-
native instructions that are similar in effect but arguably less rigid. 
2. The "reasonable doubt" instruction- Some courts have attemp-
32. Desirable and undesirable compromises are difficult to define and the distinction, to some 
degree, is subjective. Generally, however, desirable compromises are motivated by the merits 
of the case or a desire to seek justice through the proper channels. See infra notes 85-91 and 
accompanying text. A compromise verdict resulting from the jury's concern that the prosecutor 
overcharged is desirable. If the only alternatives are a hung jury, conviction of an offense more 
serious than the defendant committed, or acquitting a guilty defendant, compromise should be 
encouraged. On the other hand, compromise should not be facilitated when the compromise 
does not serve a desirable purpose. For examples of unmerited compromise, see infra note 70. 
33. This scenario assumes that jurors understand and follow the instructions that place them 
in this predicament. For jurors to follow instructions, two things must happen: they must understand 
the instructions when delivered, and choose to apply them when relevant to deliberations. 
Many studies question the ability of jurors to understand common instructions as currently 
written. See Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic 
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic 
Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or In Light of It?, 1 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 163 (1977); 
Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976). A pro-
blem with these studies is that they do not take account of the jury's collective education and 
memory. They did not, for example, allow deliberation on the meaning of the instructions, 
and therefore neglected to mention that, on a 12-person jury, eight or nine jurors would have 
understood the instruction correctly. If general psychological characteristics about jury delibera-
tions apply, the majority will convince the minority of the correct interpretation. See infra note 40. 
Even if the studies generally are valid, their conclusions do not apply to lesser included offense 
instructions. The reasons given in the studies for lack of juror comprehension - unfamiliar terms, 
abstract terms, use of negative language, ambiguous homonyms, and complex sentence structure -
do not exist in lesser included offense instructions. The only problem of incomprehensibility 
might be with the "reasonable doubt" instruction. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
Once the jurors understand the instruction, they will apply it when deliberating. The jury studies 
draw a distinction between instructions advising the jury to disregard certain information (usually 
a prior criminal record) and instructions outlining the jury's task (defining offenses, explaining 
deliberation procedures). Juries tend to follow task instructions but often do not follow instruc-
tions to disregard evidence. See Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 30 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982) Researchers have taken instruc-
tions explaining difficult legal concepts, such as the definition of "insanity" and, by varying 
them slightly, found that jurors responded by varying their likelihood of conviction. See, e.g., 
R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 66-77 (1967). Lesser included offense in-
structions seem to fit in the "task" category because they outline the procedures by which the 
jury determines the verdict and do not require the jury to disregard something used during the trial. 
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ted to soften the restrictive acquittal instruction by instructing jurors to 
consider lesser included offenses only after a reasonable doubt exists about 
the defendant's guilt on the charged offense. This "reasonable doubt" 
approach instructs jurors that, "[i]f you are not satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense charged, or 
you entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, you may con-
sider [lesser included offenses]." 34 
Courts adopting this "reasonable doubt" instruction contend that it 
merely sets out a sequence of offenses for the jury to consider and does 
not require agreement on the charged offense. 35 In practice, however, 
the instruction is practically indistinguishable from the acquittal instruc-
tion. For instance, Michigan courts first accepted the reasonable doubt 
instruction as an acceptable alternative to the "coercive" and "unduly 
restrictive" acquittal instruction. 36 After eight years of use, however, 
t_he Michigan Supreme Court held that the effect of the reasonable doubt 
instruction on the jury was the same as that of the acquittal instruction. 37 
Even if some courts fail to recognize the similarities between the two 
instructions, juries probably do. The likely effect of the reasonable doubt 
instruction is to encourage jurors to consider lesser included offenses 
only after acquittal on the charged offense. The subtle legal distinctions 
between the two standards are difficult to grasp. The concept of 
reasonable doubt is technical, especially in the lesser included offense 
context, and has been given a whole spectrum of meanings, some quite 
counterintuitive. In addition, courts often confuse the two standards in 
34. People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d 912, 914 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). This instruction has been 
accepted in Georgia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin. See Evans v. State, 148 Ga. App. 422, 251 S.E.2d 
325 (1978); State v. Santiago, 55 Hawaii 162, 516 P.2d 1256 (1973); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 
2d 63, 288 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1980). 
35. See Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. ll20 
(1969); People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d 912 (Colo. App. 1981); Franey v. United States, 382 A.2d 
1019 (D.C. 1978); Brownlee v. State, 155 Ga. App. 875, 273 S.E.2d 636 (1980); Evans v. State, 
148 Ga. App. 422, 251 S.E.2d 325 (1978); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 288 N.W.2d 874 
(Ct. App. 1980). 
36. People v. Ray, 43 Mich. App. 45, 50, 204 N.W.2d 38, 41 (1972). 
37. People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 623, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (1980). 
Other courts, however, disagree. Many post-Mays decisions in other states have chosen to 
uphold similar instructions despite recognizing the Mays decision. See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 
1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981); People v. McGregor, 
635 P.2d 912 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Even the Michigan appellate courts have been divided in 
their response to Mays, limiting its scope to cases where the language of the trial judge's instruc-
tion copied the instruction rejected by the Michigan Supreme Court. Compare People v. Hender-
son, 113 Mich. App. 505, 317 N.W.2d 340 (1982) and People v. Handley, IOI Mich. App. 130, 
300 N.W.2d 502 (overturning convictions following lesser included offense instructions) with People 
v. Leverette, ll2 Mich. App. 142, 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982) (holding that the instruction did not 
explicitly state that a verdict had to be reached on the greater offense before consideration of 
the lesser offenses) and People v. Barker, JOI Mich. App. 599, 300 N.W.2d 648 (1980) (holding 
that the instruction did not explicitly preclude the jury from considering the lesser included of-
fense before considering the charged offense). 
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practice, thus making the jury's task even more difficult. 18 The reasonable 
doubt instruction also affects jury behavior in the same way as an ac-
quittal instruction. Juries may view this instruction as requiring that the 
entire jury have reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the charged 
offense - a standard requiring acquittal - before proceeding to the 
lesser offense. 39 
Despite the original intentions of judges first recommending it, in prac-
tice the reasonable doubt instruction is difficult to distinguish from the 
acquittal instruction. Because of the confusion inherent in the reasonable 
doubt instruction, jurors will not consider lesser included offenses until 
they have decided to acquit the defendant on the charged offense. Con-
sequently, the problems that plague acquittal instructions - coercion 
and an inability to pursue reasonable compromise - also plague 
reasonable doubt instructions. 
Many courts are attempting to minimize the hung jury problem with 
restrictive instructions that force juries to deliberate on the charged of-
fense until reaching a conclusion. This approach admittedly produces 
verdicts but at the loss of the free will of minority jurors, who are often 
forced to go along with the decision because of judicial barriers to con-
sideration of lesser offenses. 
II. AVOIDING COERCIVE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
Both the acquittal instruction and the reasonable doubt instruction 
have a coercive effect on jurors. Although some coercion may be 
tolerable - and even necessary where a juror is unreasonably stubborn 
- as a matter of principle it should be the exception, not the rule. 
A. The Problem With Coercive Instructions 
Restrictive lesser included offense instructions may help avoid hung 
juries, but only at the risk of another threat to the deliberation process: 
38. Many courts upholding the reasonable doubt instruction cite acquittal instruction cases 
for support. See, e.g., Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1120 (1969); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981); Evans v. State, 148 Ga. 
App. 422, 251 S.E.2d 325 (1978); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 288 N. W .2d 874 (Ct. App. 1980). 
Some courts have denied that acquittal instructions ever require acquittal on the charged of-
fense before consideration of lesser included offenses. See Pinson v. State, 251 S.W. 1092 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1923); see also People v. Walker, 58 Mich. App. 519, 228 N.W.2d 443 (1975). 
39. The Michigan courts have realized that confusion, as well as coercion, can endanger jury 
deliberations. In People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 288 N.W.2d 207 (1980), the Michigan Supreme 
Court reversed a conviction following the reasonable doubt instruction and ruled that instructions 
"convey[ing] the impression" that acquittal must precede lesser included offense deliberations 
are erroneous. 407 Mich. at 623, 288 N.W.2d at 208. See also People v. Embry, 68 Mich. App. 
667, 673, 243 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1976). See generally supra note 33. 
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juror coercion. Minority jurors have three options once the jury appears 
deadlocked: persuade the majority to reverse its views, hold out for a 
hung jury, or change their own minds. It is rare that a minority can change 
the majority's mind. 40 The jury either ''hangs'' or the minority changes 
its mind. The shift in the minority vote may come from the majority 
persuading the dissenters on the merits of the case, perhaps by pointing 
out inconsistencies in testimony or attacking evidence. 41 Nevertheless, 
many minority shifts stem from the majority engendering a feeling of 
inferiority or unreasonableness in the minority. 42 
Mindful of the trouble and expense of a second trial, judges sometimes 
maximize this coercive effect. They may try to obtain a jury verdict even 
after a long deadlock by refusing to declare mistrials or by giving sup-
plemental instructions to compel a jury verdict. 43 They may make 
statements to the jury emphasizing the need to reach a decision, the 
burden the minority must undertake to convince the majority, the lack 
of options, and the burden that dissent places on the majority jurors 
and on the smooth functioning of the courts. 44 Judges intensify this coer-
cive effect by givirig the acquittal instruction supplementally, or by 
repeating it after the jury reaches an impasse. 45 
40. Studies indicate that the initial minority on the jury usually loses out to the numbers 
or the reasoning of the majority. The Chicago Jury Project found that 90% of the first-ballot 
majorities determined the outcome. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 488. See also 
M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 94-97 (reviewing the literature on group interaction 
on juries and concluding that "[w]hether one is studying risk taking, ethical decisionmaking, 
attitudes, negotiation and conflict, or jury decisionmaking, if the members initially lean in one 
direction, the group interaction process draws them further in that same direction"). 
In many cases, appellate courts have held that the acquittal instruction had coercive effects 
on verdicts. See People v. West, 408 Mich. 332, 291 N.W.2d 6 (1976); People v. Hurst, 395 
Mich. I, 238 N.W.2d 6 (1976); People v. Summers, 73 Mich. App. 411,251 N.W.2d 311 (1977); 
People v. Harmon, 54 Mich. App. 393, 221 N.W:2d 176 (1974); State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App. 
91, 580 P.2d 1049 (1978). 
When the case ends in a hung jury, it is likely that deliberations began with a large minority. 
"It requires a massive minority of four or five jurors at the first vote to develop the likelihood 
of a hung jury." H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 462. 
41. See M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 96-98 (explaining deliberative processes after 
the jury becomes divided). · 
42. Although it is difficult to determine the precise content of jury deliberations, it is possi-
ble to infer that many verdicts are the result of the minority accepting the majority's results 
for reasons other than a true belief in that position. For anecdotal evidence, see supra note 70. 
For evidence of that belief by legal commentators, see infra note 49. Appellate courts also feel 
that illegitimate coercion could account for trial results. See infra notes 45-49. 
43. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 129. 
44. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
45. Although the Devitt and Blackmar instruction, see supra note 25, is written for the judge 
to give before jury deliberations begin, judges often give the acquittal instruction supplementally. 
The acquittal instruction has been given supplementally in many cases during jury deadlocks. 
See, e.g., People v. Harmon, 54 Mich. App. 393, 221 N.W.2d 176 (1974); People v. Ray, 43 
Mich. App. 45, 204 N.W.2d 38 (1972); State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App. 91, 580 P.2d 1049 (1978); 
Ballinger v. State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968). In each case, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty" 
on the charged offense after receiving the instruction. With the exception of Ballinger, each court 
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Such supplemental instructions create pressure on the jury. 46 Appellate 
courts have responded _to this situation by occasionally reversing con-
victions obtained with the aid of such instructions. For instance, the judge 
cannot demand a decision from the jury, 47 or inquire into the numerical 
division of the jury, 48 or ask minority jurors to reconsider the 
ruled that the instruction was prejudicial. See supra note 40. 
The coercion implied by the supplemental acquittal instruction led the court in State v. Ogden 
to consider the instruction a "modified Allen charge." 35 Or. App. at 94, 580 P.2d at 1051. 
See infra note 49. 
Regardless of when judges give the instruction, its coercive qualities are unaltered. Although 
it is theoretically possible, if the judge gives the acquittal instruction before deliberations, for 
the majority on the jury to change its conviction votes for acquittal to obtain a compromise 
verdict on a lesser charge, this does not happen in practice. Current research on jury behavior 
indicates that, once the majority has the advantage, it can and will use the instructions to get 
its verdict. 
46. Deliberations are a tense time. Jurors must make difficult decisions that are of vital_im-
portance to the parties involved. In addition, minority jurors feel pressured by their need to 
defend their position against a larger number of adversaries, and by the erosion of support for 
their position. See Stasser, Kerr & Bray, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations: Struc-
ture, Process, and Product, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 241-47 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 
eds. 1982). Under these circumstances, jurors are likely to feel coerced by judges calling them 
out of the jury room to remind them of their duties and obligations. See LAW REFORM CoMM'N 
OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 108-09; SA J. MOORE, supra note 19, 1 31.04[3); Schulhofer, 
supra note 2, at 487. 
In People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977), the California 
Supreme Court, in an extensive review of the Allen instruction, found certain supplemental in-
structions prejudicial. The court said that during a jury deadlock, the jurors are most suscep-
tible to judicial influence and concluded, "[i]t is hard to conceive of circumstances in which 
error is more capable of producing prejudicial consequences." Id. at 855, 566 P.2d at 1008, 
139 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
47. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (reversing, "under all the circumstances," 
a verdict that was prompted by the trial judge's supplemental exhortation, "(y]ou have got to 
reach a decision in this case"); cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
461 (1978) (upholding the reversal of convictions based on the jury foreman's understanding 
of an ex parte comment by the trial judge that the case must be decided "one way or another"). 
But see United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977) (using the "under 
all the circumstances" test in Jenkins to deny habeas corpus claim where trial judge ignored 
juror requests to suspend deliberations during the evening and the jury delivered a verdict at 
3:22 a.m.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978); United States ex rel. Anthony v Sielaff, 552 F.2d 
588 (7th Cir. 1977) (using "under all the circumstances" language to find a lack of coercive 
effect in polling the jury to determine prospects of agreement on a verdict despite circumstantial 
evidence of coercion). 
48. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1946) (reversing a conviction that followed the 
judicial inquiry into the numerical division of the jury). State courts have differed in their ap-
plication of the Brasfield rule because of doubts about its basis. Some state courts have followed 
it based on federal constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, 299 A.2d 
841 (1973); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 
91, 547 P .2d 574 (1976). Others have denied that Brasfield is binding on state proceedings, either 
because the decision was based on the Supreme Court's advisory power over the federal courts, 
see, e.g., Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); 
Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979); Sharplin v. State, 
330 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1976); State v. Morris, 476 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1971), or because the courts 
decided that a factual inquiry into the coercive effect on the jury was more appropriate, see, 
e.g., People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 442 P .2d 553, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968); Lowe v. State, 
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reasonableness of their views. 49 Although acquittal and reasonable doubt 
instructions have not typically been found to be excessively coercive, the 
absence of legal coercive sanctions should not commend them to 
widespread use. Indeed, judges overseeing jury trials should eschew ev_en 
the potential for active coercion. 
Nevertheless, a different form of lesser included offense instruction 
may help prevent the disagreements that lead to hung juries and coer-
cion. Rather than awaiting a deadlock and attacking it by forcing all 
jurors to agree on one offense, modified lesser included offense instruc-
tions could be used to prevent deadlocks from occurring by promoting 
discussion on a mutually agreeable compromise. Moreover, if properly 
given, these instructions should not lead to unchecked jury discretion 
or unmerited compromise. 
B. The "Disagreement" Instruction as a Solution to Coercion 
Courts in Michigan and Oregon have attempted to avoid coercive 
deliberations by adopting instructions that do not require any form of 
175 Colo. 491,488 P.2d 559 (1971); Huffaker v. State, 119 Ga. App. 742, 168 S.E.2d 895 (1969); 
Joyner v. State, 484 P.2d 560 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). 
49. The controversy about this instruction, called the "Allen instruction" or the "dynamite 
charge," originated in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). The Supreme Court, in 
upholding the conviction, summarized the trial court's instruction: 
[J)f much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider 
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds 
of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other 
hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether 
they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not con-
curred in by the majority. 
Id. at 501. Because the instruction was effective at producing verdicts, it was rapidly accepted. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not reconsidered its position on the instruc-
tion, the modern trend is for courts to limit or abandon the Allen instruction. The Third, Seventh, 
and District of Columbia Circuits have held that the instruction is coercive for almost all pur-
poses. See United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 
449 F.2d ll77 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). Other federal circuits have limited 
the instruction by preventing judges from giving it too early in deliberations, see United States 
v. Contreras, 463 F .2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972), by requiring an additional instruction that tells jurors 
not to surrender honest, conscientious beliefs, see United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263 (9th 
Cir. 1981), or by not permitting judges to give it more than once, see United States v. Bailey, 
480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(affirming a conviction after the Allen instruction had been given twice, stating that coercive 
impact increased with each appeal by the court to the jury, but each instance should be evaluated 
in its circumstances), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978). 
At least 23 states have disapproved Allen-type instructions, in whole or in part. See People 
v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977), (citing cases from 22 other 
states and analyzing the debate over the Allen instruction). See generally SA J. MOORE, supra 
note 19, 1 31.04(2); Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal Cases: ls the Dynamite Charge 
About to be Permanently Defused?, 43 Mo. L. REV. 613 (1977); Comment, An Argument for 
the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 939 (1975). 
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agreement on the charged offense before allowing discussion of lesser 
included offenses. so This "disagreement" instruction directs the jurors 
to consider the charged offense first, but unless they agree to convict, 
they may consider any lesser included offense. s I Although only two states 
recommend disagreement instructions, some federal courts have implicitly 
accepted the standard. 52 
The disagreement instruction can improve jury deliberations and reduce 
the number of hung juries. It does this by offering the jury more deci-
sion alternatives, earlier in deliberations, on which the jury can arrive 
at a mutually agreed-upon verdict. Critics contend that easing coercion 
by promoting compromise is not likely to reduce hung juries. Alternative-
ly, they argue that if it does, it will do so by causing the early abandon-
ment of deliberations to reach a quick verdict upon a mutually agreeable, 
but greatly reduced, offense, 53 thus allowing some defendants to avoid 
proper punishment. Nevertheless, social science studies and close analysis 
of the procedural setting demonstrate that increasing jury options will 
reduce the number of hung juries without necessarily leading to excessive 
unmerited compromise. 
1. Social science research and reducing hung juries- The social 
sciences provide insight into jury deliberations that aids in understand-
ing the effects of different jury instructions. Research in two areas 
- increasing the number of options open to jurors, and allowing juries 
to return nonunanimous decisions - lend support to the proposition 
that disagreement instructions can aid juries in reaching a verdict. 
Several experimental jury studies have determined the effect of increas-
ing the jury's verdict options. Although the studies could not replicate 
the hung jury situation, they concluded that lesser included offense 
deliberation leads to compromise on a lesser offense. 54 From this con-
50. See People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 288 N.W.2d 207 (1980); State v. Ogden, 35 Or. 
App. 91, 580 P .2d 1049 (I 978). 
51. Mays, 407 Mich. at 623 n.l, 288 N.W.2d at 208 n.l. Oregon's instruction is similar: 
"First consider the charge in the accusatory instrument and if [you] cannot agree on a verdict 
on this charge, [you] should then consider the lesser included offenses." State v. Ogden, 36 Or. 
App. at 98, 580 P .2d at I 053. 
52. In cases where federal judges were motivated more by desperation than by specific judicial 
rules, they instructed long-deadlocked juries to try to reach an agreement on any instructed of-
fense, regardless of their lack of agreement on the charged offense. See, e.g., United States 
v. Dixon, 507 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Smoot, 
463 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Singleton, 447 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
The more common federal policy is use of the "aquittal" instruction. See supra notes 25-26. 
53. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. 
54. See Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of 
Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1972) (In 54% of the mock trials, 
the jury acquitted when the choice in a homicide trial was guilty of first-degree murder or not 
guilty. When the jury had four options, they returned verdicts of first-degree murder in 8% 
of the cases, second-degree murder in 63%, manslaughter in 21 %, and not guilty in 8%). Many 
researchers have replicated aspects of Professor Vidmar's study and found analogous results. 
See Hamilton, Obedience and Responsibility: A Jury Simulation, 36 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
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clusion one can inf er that the disagreement instruction can reduce hung 
juries. If mock jurors are choosing from a range of verdicts and reaching 
agreement, this indicates that more options change the substance of 
deliberations and that new discussion on the lesser offense can lead to 
an otherwise unobtainable unanimity. 
Following the 1972 Supreme Court decisions holding that jury ver-
dicts in state criminal cases need not be unanimous, 55 many researchers 
sought to determine the effect a nonunanimous verdict has on 
deliberations. 56 These studies concluded that changing the decision rule 
to nonunanimous final verdicts reduced the number of hung juries. 57 
A disagreement instruction, like a jury that need not be unanimous, can 
alter the decision rule by promoting discussion on more ways to reach 
a verdict and by giving the jury the option of agreeing on an offense 
with fewer elements. 58 Investigations of jury decision making in civil 
PSYCHOLOGY 126 (1978); Kaplan & Simon, Latitude and Severity of Sentencing Option, Race 
of the Victim and Decisions of Simulated Jurors: Some Issues Arising From the "Algiers Motel" 
Trial, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 87 (1972); Roberts, Hoffman & Johnson, Effects of Jury Delibera-
tion on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors: Vidmar Revisited, 47 PERCEP-
TUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 119 (1978). 
55. These decisions were Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 365 (1972), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1972). Although unanimity is not a constitutional requirement, only six states 
allow less-than-unanimous final jury verdicts in criminal cases. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. 
art. I,§ 11, TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13. With the exception of Louisiana and Oregon, nonunanimous 
verdicts are allowed only in certain circumstances, usually for minor offenses. See generally Israel, 
On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 467 (1982). 
56. See, e.g., Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of6- and 12-Person 
Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and 2/3 Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 
1 (1975); Foss, Structural Effects in Simulated Jury Decision Making, 40 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOLOGY 1055 (1981); Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. 
Unanimous Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 38 (1977); Saks & Ostrum, Jury 
Size and Consensus Requirements: The Laws of Probability v. the Laws of the Land, I J. 
CoNTEMP. L. 163 (1975). 
57. On the basis of Kalven and Zeisel's limited observations, they predict that non unanimous 
. jury verdicts reduce hung juries by 450Jo. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 461; see also 
supra note 11. Professor Saks, in his review of the unanimous-nonunanimous jury verdict studies, 
concluded that "[u]nanimous juries, in comparison to quorum juries, deliberate longer, [and] 
are more likely to hang." M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 105 (1977). See also Foss, supra note 
56 (using simulated jurors, this study found that juries rendering 10-2 verdicts made decisions 
twice as quickly and were much less likely to hang than juries with a unanimity requirement); 
Kerr, Atkin, Strasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Con-
cept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALI-
TY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 282 (1976) (study of IOI six-person mock juries composed of 
undergraduate students, with a 30-minute limit on deliberations, found that the requirement of 
unanimity resulted in almost four times as many hung juries; when hung juries were eliminated 
from the analysis, the decision rule did not have a significant effect on verdicts). 
Professor Michael Saks summarized the research findings: "As a consequence of reduced [social 
decision rules), fewer hung juries are anticipated not only by the mathematical model, but also 
by the litigants, all members of the [Supreme) Court, and every other commentator I have en-
countered on the unanimity-nonunanimity debate." M. SAKS, supra, at 29. 
58. See supra notes 23-27, 30-31 & 54 and accompanying text. 
Some commentators have suggested that "lowering the barriers" to consensus infringes on 
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litigation indicate that more discussion options may help juries reach deci-
sions in more cases. 59 
protections of the accused, either by effectively lowering the standard for guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt or by providing prosecutors with a conviction when they did not meet their burdens. Pro-
fessors Saks and Hastie explained the effects of reducing the social decision rule from unanimity 
to quorum: 
Quorum juries are more likely to produce verdicts as opposed to hanging; this is ac-
complished by reaching decisions on the basis of weaker evidence; and this means that 
more errors of both types will occur: convictions when the correct decision is acquittal; 
acquittals· when the correct decision is conviction. Increased efficiency is purchased at 
some cost in accuracy. In practice, then, a relaxation in the decision rule should be 
expected to produce a reduction in the rate of convictions, since most trials currently 
result in convictions. The decrease, however, is a result of increased error. 
M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 84-85 (emphasis in original). 
The possibility of erroneous results is an important concern when the issue is reducing the 
size of the jury, see Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research 
and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 644, 668-84 (1975), or reducing the decision rule 
to allow nonunanimous verdicts, see M. SAKS, supra note 57, at 24-31. By changing the agenda 
of the jury through lesser included offense instructions which promote compromise, defendants 
found innocent might now be found guilty of lesser offenses. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 
54, at 215 (finding that mock jurors with a choice of guilt of first-degree murder or not guilty 
convicted in 46% of the trials and acquitted in 54%; mock jurors given a choice of guilty of 
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, and not guilty, acquitted in only 
8 % of the cases). 
Even if juror compromise is conviction prone, the fairness of the outcome is not compromised. 
Jurors generally decide cases on the merits and take their duties seriously, so a different agenda 
should not cause them to evaluate the substantive issues differently. See infra notes 71-84 and 
accompanying text. 
The reasons for increased error under altered decision rules are not created by giving the jury 
more options during deadlocks. In cases with six-person juries, the possibility for error exists 
because minority views may not be represented, and because dissent by only one juror is more 
frequent. Sole dissenters may acquiesce faster than groups of dissenters. With a quorum decision 
rule, the minority is overridden even if it does not choose to acquiesce. Opening discussion to 
several different offenses should increase the fairness of the deliberation process by assuring 
that the jury has the opportunity to match the defendant's conviction with actual culpability. 
See SA J. MOORE, supra note 19, 131.03[1]; Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included 
Offenses: A Herculean Task for Michigan Courts, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 41, 52. 
59. The persuasive techniques used by jurors to reach a consensus on a verdict differ from 
when the result sought is a damage award. A verdict decision is a dichotomy; jurors can acquit 
or convict. A damage amount, however, is a continuum; jurors can favor any figure ranging 
from zero dollars to the maximum amount. In arriving at a damage award, there are more op-
tions to choose from and more techniques of persuasion may be employed to reach a result. 
As part of the Chicago Jury Project, see supra note 9, Hawkins studied the deliberations of 
46 mock juries made up from jury pools, who listened to a tape-recorded personal injury trial. 
"When jurors differed in their opinions on damages, they could settle their differences by bargain-
ing. On liability, on the other hand, if they once became openly aligned on the issue, differences 
of opinion could be settled only by a complete capitulation of one side." C. Hawkins, Interac-
tion and Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury 
Deliberations (Aug. 17, 1960) (unpublished thesis). "A continuum may develop (i.e., $5,000; 
$10,000; $15,000) in deciding damages for the plaintiff, and bargaining and compromise may 
take place within the deliberations to arrive at an equitable settlement." Kessler, The Social Psy-
chology of Jury Deliberations, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICAN 67, 86 (R. Simon ed. 1975) 
(citing C. Hawkins, supra, at 58-59). The ability of jurors to resolve their differences by com-
promise relies on having a range of decisions to choose from. This analysis was developed in 
cases involving money damages, "but it might also apply where a jury must resolve multiple 
counts or choose the appropriate level of an offense." Lempert, supra note 58, at 680. 
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2. The potential for reducing hung juries- An instruction pro-
moting compromise on lesser included offenses has the potential to 
reduce significantly the number of hung juries. Several factors indicate 
that most hung juries occur in cases where discussion of lesser includ-
ed offenses may be available but is prohibited by restrictive judicial 
instructions. First, most criminal codes are composed of relatively few 
offense categories but many of these contain several grades of an of-
fense based on the seriousness of conduct. 60 When the prosecutor charges 
the defendant with a serious grade of offense, the lower grades often 
constitute lesser included offenses and could easily become a part of 
jury deliberations. 61 
Second, most defendants are initially charged with the most serious 
offense within an offense category that the prosecutor feels can be found 
on the evidence to be presented at trial. 62 Consequently, charge reduc-
tion is often used when prosecutors are overzealous; the same outcome 
can result if the jury can have this option available in deliberations. 
Third, those few defendants brought to trial are charged with relatively 
serious offenses. 63 When they arrive at trial, they may be convicted of 
60. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2150 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II,§ 4201 (1979); 
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-4501 (1981); VA. CODE§ 18.2-9 (1982); see also J. LEVINE, M. MUSHEMO 
& D. PALUMBO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH 206-07 (1980) (giving the 
hypothetical example of how a drunk who mugs someone on a subway with a gun may be charged 
with as many as seven different crimes). 
61. For example, a defendant accused of rape under such a statute may be cnargeu w1L11 
one or more degrees of criminal sexual conduct. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 750.520(a)-
(e) (Supp. 1981) (creating four degrees of criminal sexual conduct). A defendant charged with 
one degree of criminal sexual conduct may necessarily be guilty of some lesser degrees. See, 
e.g., People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d 268 (1977); see also People v. Gorney, 
99 Mich. App. 199, 297 N.W.2d 648 (1980). But see, e.g., People v. Green, 86 Mich. App. 142, 
272 N. W.2d 216 (1978) (second degree conduct is a necessarily included offense of first degree 
conduct, but neither third nor fourth degree conduct constitutes a necessarily included offense 
of first or second degree conduct). 
62. Concerning the decision whether to charge, Professors Michael and Don Gottfredson 
cite among the goals of the prosecutor's charging decisions, utilization of resources and "the 
desire to support the police informant network or to accomodate the prosecution of more signifi-
cant 'higher ups' in a criminal conspiracy." M. GOTTFREDSON & D. GoTTFREDSON, DECISION-
MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 150 (1980). They also cite a U.S. Department of Justice study of 
charge dismissal in Los Angeles County where, based on 78,000 arrests, "most of the rejected 
felony arrests were based on a lack of evidence and the district attorney's belief that the case 
was not serious enough to warrant felony processing." Id. at 158 (citing P. GREENWOOD, S. 
WILDHORN, E. POGGIN, M. STRUMWASSER & P. DELEON, PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFEN-
DANTS IN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1973)). 
Prosecutors have little to lose during the decision of what to charge by overcharging. Pro-
secutors always have the option of reducing charges on their own initiative if they erred in their 
judgments and cannot prove guilt. See J. LEVINE, M. MusHENO & D. PALUMBO, supra note 60, 
at 207. Empirical studies indicate the prevalence of charging serious offenses. See Forst & Brosi, 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 177 (1977) (finding 
that prosecutors attached the most importance, during the charging decision, to the strength 
of the evidence and the seriousness of the case). 
63. See M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 102-10 (1978); Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea 
Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common Crimes, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 
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many possible crimes: the charged offense or the less serious included 
offenses. 
Fourth, after a hung jury the prosecutor often chooses to pursue a 
retrial on a lesser offense. 64 The disagreement instruction would allow 
jurors to make that same decision, but in the course of the first trial. 65 
3. When compromise should be a concern- Not withstanding the ad-
vantages of reducing hung juries without coercive procedures the increased 
opportunity to compromise offered by the disagreement instruction may 
result in verdicts motivated by concerns unrelated to the merits of the 
case. While studying the Oregon rule allowing ten-two jury verdicts, Pro-
fessors Kalven and Zeisel found that juries returned non unanimous ver-
dicts in twenty-five percent of the cases, compared with the five percent 
national hung jury rate. They attributed this to the practice of stopping 
deliberations after reaching the requisite majority. 66 Courts and social 
scientists assert that such results may mark the existence of unmerited 
compromise or a tendency to ignore the minority in the jury. 67 In Peo-
ple v. Clemente, 68 for instance, the New York Court of Appeals com-
plained that "[the jury] may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower 
degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly 
warranted." 69 Jurors occasionally confirm these fears in post-trial in-
terviews with reporters, sometimes indicating that their decision was 
motivated more by a desire to be finished with the trial than with the 
proofs offered by each side. 10 
431, 443-44 (1979). Heumann and Katz both suggest that time pressures on prosecutors at the 
state level require that minor cases be disposed of quickly, either through dismissals or guilty 
pleas. State prosecutors are organized to respond to the police, who in turn respond to the citizenry. 
Federal prosecutors have greater potential for determining the composition and size of their 
caseloads. See Hogan & Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld 
Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 467, 467-70 (1979). Even at the 
federal level, however, prosecutors select the serious cases to bring to trial. See Frase, The Deci-
sion to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Qualitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980). 
64. See Fried, Kaplan & Klein, Juror Selection: An Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM 
IN AMERICA 54 (R. Simon ed. 1975) (noting that the prosecutor "will typically drastically reduce 
the charges after a single hung jury outcome"). 
65. See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 588. 
66. Kalven & Zeise!, The American Jury: Notes for an English Controversy, 48 CHI. B. 
REc. 195, 201 (1967). 
67. See, e.g., M. SAKS, supra note 57, at 20-24 (suggesting that communication to and from 
minority jurors decreases when their views cannot affect the final decision); Nemeth, supra note 
56 (finding that, in three studies of unanimous versus quorum verdicts, verdicts did not change 
but the unanimous juries reported reaching a full consensus, more confidence in the verdict, 
and a feeling that justice had been administered). 
68. 285 A.D. 258, 136 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1954). 
69. Id. at 264, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 207. 
70. Anecdotal evidence in the form of juror interviews after publicized trials provide ex-
amples of how juror yotes may be cast without regard to guilt or innocence. During deliberations 
in the murder trial of Juan Corona, a holdout juror for acquittal at one time in the deliberations 
said: "Please, I'll change my vote. Just don't hate me. I'll change my vote so you can go 
home to your wife." Wrightsman, The American Trial Jury on Trial: Empirical Evidence and 
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If juror compromise unrelated to the merits of the case occurs when 
judges off er juries the extensive deliberative discretion provided by the 
disagreement instruction, most courts are correct in refusing to give it. 
Nevertheless, a close examination of the existence and effects of the sort 
of compromise promoted by the disagreement instruction indicates that 
compromise verdicts should not compel rejection of the disagreement 
instruction. 
C. A voiding Unmerited Compromise 
The disagreement instruction offers a method for preventing hung juries 
and juror coercion, but at the risk of unmerited compromise. Close ex-
amination, however, indicates that unmerited compromise rarely arises 
and even when it does, it may be desirable for equitable reasons. On 
balance, the benefits of promoting this kind of compromise outweigh 
the coercion inherent in other instructions as well as the minimal risk 
of unmerited compromise. 
1. The occurrence of compromise- The process of jury delibera-
tions has received extensive attention. Although many studies of jury 
deliberations do not specifically consider the effects of different lesser 
included offense instructions, their results are relevant in determining 
whether jurors will overcome the temptation to compromise too quickly 
and render a verdict that adequately considers the charged offense. 
Some unmerited compromise will invariably occur; jurors sometimes 
do make quick compromises for reasons unrelated to the merits. Inter-
views with jurors after controversial trials demonstrate that juries 
sometimes compromise for the wrong reasons. 11 Some experimental 
studies with mock juries indicate that the examples may not be atypical 
and that certain factors unrelated to the issues preoccupy some jurors. 72 
The number of trials in which unmerited compromise will determine the 
Procedural Modifications, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES 137, 157 (1978) (citing V. VILLASENOR, JURY: THE 
PEOPLE VS. JUAN CORONA (1977)). 
During the trial of the Harrisburg Seven, some jurors characterized the deliberations as 
" 'blurred, quarreling, timeless periods of irrational arguments,' during which two jurors nearly 
came to blows and another kept referring to himself as 'serving God's wiJJ.' " J. LEVINE, M. 
MusHENO & D. PALUMBO, supra note 60, at 290-91 (citing Village Voice, Feb. 8, 1973, at 9). 
See also H. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 136 (offering the example of a young mother on a jury 
who voted to convict the defendant of rape against her better judgment: "I knew I had those 
children at home and we would never get out of there if we tried to argue it out with the others."). 
See also M. SAKs, supra note 57, at 3. 
71. See supra note 70. 
72. See, e.g., Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Ver-
dicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 123 (R. Simon ed. 1975) (using real jurors and a videotaped 
trial, the authors in this simulated jury study found that juries exposed to pretrial publicity, 
in the form of the defendant's prior criminal record and alleged repudiated confession, were 
more likely to convict than unexposed jurors); James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 
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verdict, however, is probably insignificant, according to experimental 
studies, studies of actual jury behavior, and case examples. 
Experimental studies do not provide a sufficient basis for demonstrating 
that unmerited compromise is significant. First, the results of the studies 
are at best divided. Indeed, in contrast to some earlier, less elaborate 
studies, 73 recent mock jury studies have found that jurors base their deci-
sions on the evidence and the facts of the case. 74 Second, experimental 
studies cannot duplicate the experience of serving on a jury. The com-
mon caution with experimental studies applies; experiments cannot 
replicate actual involvement in the situation. 75 Indeed, real jurors may 
perform better than mock jurors because of the seriousness and respon-
sibility that accompany a real trial. 76 
Studies of actual jury behavior, drawn from real cases, provide the 
best support that the jury makes its decisions based on the evidence. 
AM. J. Soc. 563 (1959) (This often-cited experimental study found that about 50% of the com-
ments made during deliberations were expressions of opinions or recountings of personal ex-
periences. Only 15% of the time was spent on testimony; 25% was spent discussing procedural 
issues and 8% was spent on judge's instructions.). 
A review of mock jury studies concluded: "[S]ome degree of generalizability seems cautiously 
appropriate. It appears that extraevidential factors, such as defendant, victim, and juror 
characteristics, trial procedures, and so forth, can influence the severity of verdicts rendered 
by individual jurors." Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A Review 
of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 323, 343 (1977); see also Wrightsman, supra 
note 70, at 152 (drawing the conclusion that "the consistency of findings [in studies on the effects 
of litigant characteristics on jurors] should question the assumption that jurors process informa-
tion in a rational, objective manner, uninfluenced by characteristics of the defendant, witnesses, 
or attorneys") (summarizing the conclusion of Stephan, Selection Characteristics of Jurors and 
Litigants: Their Influences on Juries' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 97 (R. Simon 
ed. 1975)). 
73. The best example of this is contained in the research of Professor Rita James Simon. 
Her 1959 mock jury study, see supra note 72, is often offered as evidence that juries do not 
base their decisions on the issues, See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 59, at 84; Wrightsman, supra 
note 70, at 154. Professor Simon recanted this belief in her 1967 study of jury deliberations 
on the insanity defense. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 175 (1967). 
74. Some reviews of experimental jury studies conclude that "for the most part juries are 
able and willing to put aside extraneous information and base their decisions on the evidence. 
The results show that when ordinary citizens become jurors, they assume a special role in which 
they apply different standards of proof, more vigorous reasoning and greater detachment." Simon, 
Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Im-
pact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515, 528 (1977). From their review of 
the experimental research, Professors Saks and Hastie conclude: "The studies are unanimous 
in showing that evidence is a substantially more potent determinant of jurors' verdicts than 
the individual characteristics of jurors." M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 68. Professor 
Simon also performed a study on the jury's ability to understand and apply the insanity defense. 
Based on the results of actual trials, she concluded that "[t]he jurors relied very heavily on the 
record. They reviewed every piece of evidence presented during the trial." R. SIMON, supra note 
33_, at 175. 
75. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 58, at 802-03; Simon, supra note 74, at 520. 
76. Professor Simon explains one of the conclusions of the Chicago Jury Project: 
Jurors take their responsibility seriously; they check prejudices at the door of the jury 
room and recognize their special role as temporary members of the judiciary bound 
SPRING 1983) Improving Jury Deliberations 581 
Although data of this sort is difficult to obtain, 77 the Chicago Jury Pro-
ject provides enough of a research effort to determine what the American 
jury does in a real criminal trial. 78 The Project found that the jury's verdict 
agreed with how the judge would have decided the case in eighty per-
cent of the cases. 79 Based on the high percentage of agreements and on 
the reasons for the twenty percent disagreement - sentiments on the law, 
sentiments on the defendant, issues concerning evidence80- the study's 
directors claimed that the results were "a stunning refutation of the 
hypothesis that the jury does not understand [the case].' ' 8 ' On the strength 
of these findings, the Supreme Court required that states uphold the right 
to a jury trial in criminal cases and affirmed its confidence in the jury's 
ability to decide cases accurately and rationally. 82 
Examples of celebrated case results in recent years substantiate the con-
clusions of the researchers. Although the correctness of -the results in 
these individual cases cannot be systematically analyzed, extensive media 
coverage offers much data by which to evaluate those cases. Since the 
late 1960's, most controversial trials have been jury trials, including the 
trials of the Chicago Seven, Huey Newton, Angela Davis, the Harrisburg 
Thirteen, Mitchell-Stans, and John Ehrlichman. Regardless of the 
political popularity of each decision, the public and the press, as well 
as the bench and bar, generally accepted the correctness and legitimacy 
of the jury decisions. 83 In addition, a survey by the Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada indicated that ninety-six percent of jurors surveyed 
held a favorable view of the jury system. 84 
These measures of jury performance show that juries are capable of 
handling discretion. Nevertheless, the existence of unmerited compromise 
in some cases requires an evaluation of whether these cases, though in-
frequent, may still be unacceptable. 
2. The desirability of compromise- Enhancing the jury's ability to 
compromise, even in cases where the compromise is inconsistent with 
by rules of law and procedures not present in their business transactions or informal 
conversations. Ordinary citizens are willing to accept these legal trappings and work 
within them. The fears voiced by critics that jurors make capricious decisions because 
of bias, incompetence and irrelevent factors have not been substantiated. 
Simon, supra note 74, at 520. 
77. See D. GILLMOR, supra note 9, at 195-208 (describing difficulties that legal and social 
science researchers have encountered in attempting to determine the content of jury deliberations). 
78. For a description of the Project's methodology, see supra note 9. The main findings 
are reported in H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7. 
79. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 56. 
80. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
81. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 157. 
82. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968). 
83. R. SIMON, Introduction to THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICAN 13 (R. Simon ed. 1975). 
84. LAW REFORM CoMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 2. 
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the evidence, can serve important functions. The Chicago Jury Project 
found that in the twenty percent of the cases in which the jury and the 
judge disagreed, 85 the jury based its decision on the equities of the case. 86 
In most instances, the jury acquitted defendants that the judge would 
have convicted. 87 The jury acquitted defendants in these cases for a variety 
of equitable reasons: the defendant was the subject of unfairness due 
to mistreatment by the police or prosecutorial vindictiveness; the def en-
dant had already suffered enough; little blameworthiness was attached 
to the conduct charged because the victim contributed to the offense or 
the act was out of character for the defendant; or the harm caused by 
the defendant was small. 88 
Giving the jury the right to administer the conscience of the community 
should not be discouraged. This view was echoed by the Supreme Court 
in Duncan v. Louisiana89 where it held that the sixth amendment right 
to a jury trial applied to state criminal trials. In reflecting on the history 
of the right to a jury trial, the Court envisioned the jury as doing more 
than finding facts: "[a] right to jury trial is granted to criminal defen-
dants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. ... [The jury 
trial is] an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous pro-
secutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge. " 90 
• Although jury compromises unrelated to the merits of the case do 
occur, they are far more often based on principles of fairness and equi-
ty than on irresponsibility. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
concluded, it is impossible to qualify the nonevidentiary compromises 
motivated by equity from those motivated by prejudice, but jury devia-
tions from the law most often occur because of equitable concerns. 91 
CONCLUSION 
Hung juries damage the credibility of the criminal justice system. They 
leave society frustrated with the trial process, increase anxiety among 
defendants, and waste resources. The threat of a hung jury mandates 
action by juries and judges that is often neither desirable nor effective. 
Instructions to break deadlocks may threaten the autonomy and con-
fidence of minority jurors and interfere with the deliberative process. 
With proper lesser included offense instructions, however, judges can 
foster a sense of cooperation and compromise that can lead to procedural-
85. See supra notes 86-88. 
86. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 286-87, 492, 498-99. 
87. Id. at 58-59. 
88. See supra note 86. See also LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 9-10. 
89. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
90. Id. at 155-56. 
91. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 11. 
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ly and substantively fair verdicts. It is not risky to give jurors this power 
to compromise. The adversary system has assumed that the jury is capable 
of handling such power and modern investigations have supported this 
assumption. Judges should not continue to neglect opportunities like lesser 
included offense instructions to aid the jury's deliberative process. The 
jury can use the "disagreement" lesser included offense instruction to 
reach a compromise without caprice, and a consensus without coercion. 
-Michael D. Craig 

